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Abstract
Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively
studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of
utilizing only limited information in the voting process on the societal welfare for the outcome, by
bounding the distortion of voting rules. Even though there has been significant progress towards
this goal, all previous works have so far neglected the fact that in many scenarios (like presidential
elections) voting is actually a distributed procedure. In this paper, we consider a setting in which the
voters are partitioned into disjoint districts and vote locally therein to elect local winning alternatives
using a voting rule; the final outcome is then chosen from the set of these alternatives. We prove
tight bounds on the distortion of well-known voting rules for such distributed elections both from a
worst-case perspective as well as from a best-case one. Our results indicate that the partition of voters
into districts leads to considerably higher distortion, a phenomenon which we also experimentally
showcase using real-world data.
1 Introduction
In a decision-making scenario, the task is to aggregate the opinions of a group of different people into
a common decision. This process is often distributed, in the sense that smaller groups first reach an
agreement, and then the final outcome is determined based on the options proposed by each such group.
This can be due to scalability issues (e.g., it is hard to coordinate a decision between a very large number
of participants), due to different roles of the groups (e.g., when each group represents a country in the
European Union), or simply due to established institutional procedures (e.g., electoral systems).
For example, in the US presidential elections1, the voters in each of the 50 states cast their votes
within their regional district, and each state declares a winner; the final winner is taken as the one that
wins a weighted plurality vote over the state winners, with the weight of each state being proportional
to its size. Another example is the Eurovision Song Contest2, where each participating country holds a
local voting process (consisting of a committee vote and an Internet vote from the people of the country)
and then assigns points to the 10 most popular options, on a 1-12 scale (with 11 and 9 omitted). The
winner of the competition is the participant with the most total points.
The foundation of utilitarian economics, which originated near the end of the 18th century, revolves
around the idea that the outcome of a decision making process should be one that maximizes the well-
being of the society, which is typically captured by the notion of the social welfare. A fundamental
∗This work has been supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation under contract number 200021 165522 and by
the European Research Council (ERC) under grant number 639945 (ACCORD).
1https://www.usa.gov/election
2https://eurovision.tv/about/voting
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question that has been studied extensively in the related literature is whether the rules that are being
used for decision making actually achieve this goal, or to what extend they fail to do so. This motivates
the following question: What is the effect of distributed decision making on the social welfare?
The importance of this investigation is highlighted by the example of the 2016 US presidential
election [Wikipedia, 2016]. While 48.2% of the US population (that participated in the election) viewed
Hillary Clinton as the best candidate, Donald Trump won the election with only 46.1% of the popular
vote. This was due to the district-based electoral system, and the outcome would have been different
if there was a single pool of voters instead. A similar phenomenon occurred in the 2000 presidential
election as well, when Al Gore won the popular vote, but George W. Bush was elected president.
1.1 Our setting and contribution
For concreteness, we use the terminology of voting as a proxy for any distributed decision-making
scenario. A set of voters are called to vote on a set of alternatives through a district-based election. In
other words, the set of voters is partitioned into districts and each district holds a local election, following
some voting rule. The winners of the local elections are then aggregated into the single winner of the
general election. Note that this setting models many scenarios of interest, such as those highlighted in
the above discussion.
We are interested in the effect of the distributed nature of the election on the social welfare of
the voters (the sum of their valuations for the chosen outcome). Typically, this effect is quantified by
the notion of distortion [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006], which is defined as the worst-case ratio
between the maximum social welfare for any of the outcomes and the social welfare for the outcome
chosen through voting. Concretely, we are interested in bounding the distortion of voting rules for
district-based elections.
We consider three cases when it comes to the district partition:
• symmetric districts, in which every district has the same number of voters and contributes the
same weight to the final outcome,
• unweighted districts, in which the weight is still the same, but the sizes of the districts may vary,
and finally
• unrestricted districts, where the sizes and the weights of the districts are unconstrained.
For each of these cases, we show upper and lower bounds on the distortion of voting rules, under standard
assumptions.
First, in Section 3, we consider general voting rules (which might have access to the numerical
valuations of the voters) and provide distortion guarantees for any voting rule as a function of the worst-
case distortion of the voting rule when applied to a single district. As a corollary, we obtain distortion
bounds for Range Voting, i.e., the rule that outputs the alternative that maximizes the social welfare, and
prove that this mechanism is optimal among all voting rules for the problem. Then, in Section 4, we
consider ordinal rules and provide a general lower bound on the distortion of any such rule. For the
widely-used Plurality voting rule, we provide tight distortion bounds, proving that it is asymptotically
the best ordinal voting rule in terms of distortion. In Section 5, we provide experiments based on real
data to evaluate the distortion on “average case” and “average worst case” district partitions. Finally,
in Section 6, we explore whether districting (i.e., manually partitioning the voters into districts in the
best-way possible) can allow to recover the winner of Plurality or Range Voting in the election without
districts. We conclude with possible avenues for future work in Section 7.
2
1.2 Related Work
The distortion framework was first proposed by Procaccia and Rosenschein [2006] and subsequently it
was adopted by a series of papers; for instance, see [Anshelevich et al., 2018; Anshelevich and Postl,
2017; Benade et al., 2017; Bhaskar et al., 2018; Boutilier et al., 2015; Caragiannis et al., 2017; Filos-
Ratsikas and Miltersen, 2014]. The original idea of the distortion measure was to quantify the loss
in performance due to the lack of information, meaning how well can an ordinal voting rule (that has
access only to the preference orderings induced by the numerical values of the voters) can approximate
the cardinal objective. In our paper, the distortion will be attributed to two factors: always the fact
that the election is being done in districts, and possibly also the fact that the voting rules employed are
ordinal. Our setting follows closely that of Boutilier et al. [2015] and Caragiannis et al. [2017], with the
novelty of introducing district-based elections and measuring their distortion. The worst-case distortion
bounds of voting rules in the absence of districts can be found in the aforementioned papers.
The ill effects of district-based elections have been highlighted in a series of related articles, mainly
revolving around the issue of gerrymandering [Schuck, 1987], that is, the systematic manipulation of the
geographical boundaries of an electoral constituency in favor of a particular political party. The effects of
gerrymandering have been studied in the related literature before [Borodin et al., 2018; Cohen-Zemach
et al., 2018; Lev and Lewenberg, 2019], but never in relation to the induced distortion of the elections.
While our district partitions are not necessarily geographically-based, our worst-case bounds capture the
potential effects of gerrymandering on the deterioration of the social welfare. Other works on district-
based elections and distributed decision-making include [Bachrach et al., 2016; Erde´lyi et al., 2015].
Related to our results in Section 6 is the paper by Lewenberg et al. [2017], where the authors explore
the effects of districting with respect to the winner of Plurality, when ballot boxes are placed on the real
plane, and voters are partitioned into districts based on their nearest ballot box. The extra constraints
imposed by the geological nature of the districts in their setting leads to an NP-hardness result for the
districting problem, whereas for our unconstrained (other than being symmetric) districts, we prove that
making the Plurality winner the winner of the general election is always possible in polynomial time. In
contrast, the problem becomes NP-hard when we are interested in the winner of Range Voting instead
of Plurality.
2 Preliminaries
A general election E is defined as a tuple (M,N ,D,w,v, f), where
• M is a set of m alternatives;
• N is a set of n voters;
• D is a set of k districts, with district d ∈ D containing nd voters such that
∑
d∈D nd = n (i.e., the
districts define a partition of the set of voters);
• w = (wd)d∈D is a weight-vector consisting of a weight wd ∈ R>0 for each district d ∈ D;
• v = (v1, . . . ,vn) is a valuation profile for the n voters, where vi = (vij)j∈M contains the
valuation of voter i for all alternatives, and Vn is the set of all such valuation profiles;
• f = (fd)d∈D is a set of voting rules (one for each district), where fd : Vnd → M is a map of
valuation profiles with nd voters to alternatives.
For each voter i ∈ N , we denote by d(i) the district she belongs to. For each district d ∈ D, a local
or district election between its members takes place, and the winner of this election is the alternative
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jd = fd((vi)i:d(i)=d) that gets elected according to fd. The outcome of the general election E is an
alternative
j(E) ∈ arg max
j∈M
∑
d∈D
wd · 1 {jd = j} ,
where 1 {X} is equal to 1 if the event X is true, and 0 otherwise. In simple words, the winner j(E) of
the general election is the alternative with the highest weighted approval score, breaking ties arbitrarily.
For example, when all weights are 1, j(E) is the alternative that wins the most local elections.
Following the standard convention, we adopt the unit-sum representation of valuations, according
to which
∑
j∈M vij = 1 for every voter i ∈ N . For a given valuation profile v, the social welfare of
alternative j ∈M is defined as the total value the agents have for her:
SW(j|v) =
∑
i∈N
vij .
Throughout the paper, we assume that the same voting rule is applied in every local election (possibly
for a different number of voters though, depending on how the districts are defined); we denote this
voting rule by f and also let f(v) to be the alternative that is chosen by f when the voters have the
valuation profile v.
The distortion of a voting rule f in a local election with η voters is defined as the worst-case ratio,
over all possible valuation profiles of the voters participating in that election, between the maximum
social welfare of any alternative and the social welfare of the alternative chosen by the voting rule:
dist(f) = sup
v∈Vη
maxj∈M SW(j|v)
SW(f(v)|v) .
The distortion of a voting rule f in a general election is defined as the worst-case ratio, over all possible
general elections E that use f as the voting rule within the districts, between the maximum social welfare
of any alternative and the social welfare of the alternative chosen by the general election:
gdist(f) = sup
E:f∈E
maxj∈M SW(j|v)
SW(j(E)|v) .
Again, in simple words, the distortion of a voting rule f is the worst-case over all the possible valuations
that voters can have and over all possible ways of partitioning these voters into districts. When k = 1,
we recover the standard definition of the distortion.
Next, we define some standard properties of voting rules.
Definition 2.1 (Properties of voting rules). A voting rule f is
• ordinal, if the outcome only depends on the preference orderings induced by the valuations and
not the actual numerical values themselves. Formally, given a valuation profile v, let Πv be the
ordinal preference profile formed by the values of the agents for the alternatives (assuming some
fixed tie-breaking rule). A voting rule is ordinal if for any two valuation profiles v and v′ such
that Πv = Πv′ , it holds that f(v) = f(v′).
• unanimous, if whenever all agents agree on an alternative, that alternative gets elected. Formally,
whenever there exists an alternative a ∈ M for whom via ≥ vij for all voters i ∈ N and all
alternatives j ∈M, then f(v) = a.
• (strictly) Pareto efficient, if whenever all agents agree that an alternative a is better than b, then b
can not be elected instead of a. Formally, if via > vib for all i ∈ N , then f(v) 6= b.3
3We remark that Pareto efficiency usually requires that there is no other alternative who all voters weakly prefer and who
one voter strictly prefers. For our lower bounds however, using the definition of strict Pareto efficiency is sufficient; actually, it
makes our bounds even stronger. Also note that when the valuations do not exhibit ties (and therefore the induced preference
orderings are strict), the two definitions coincide.
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Remark. It is not hard to see that we can assume that the best voting rule in terms of distortion is
Pareto efficient, without loss of generality. Indeed, for any voting rule f that is not Pareto efficient, we
can construct the following Pareto efficient rule f ′: for every input on which f outputs a Pareto efficient
alternative, f ′ outputs the same alternative; for every input on which f outputs an alternative that is not
Pareto efficient, f ′ outputs a maximal Pareto improvement, that is, a Pareto efficient alternative which all
voters (weakly) prefer more than the alternative chosen by f . Clearly, f ′ is Pareto efficient and achieves
a social welfare at least as high as f . Note also that Pareto efficiency implies anonymity, so we will be
using both properties in our proofs without loss of generality. Finally, most of the voting rules that are
being employed in practice are ordinal, with the notable exception of Range Voting, which is the voting
rule that outputs the alternative that maximizes the social welfare.
We consider the following three basic cases for the general elections, depending on the size and the
weight of the districts:
• Symmetric Elections: all districts consist of n/k voters and have the same weight, i.e., nd = n/k
and wd = 1 for each d ∈ D.
• Unweighted Elections: all districts have the same weight, but not necessarily the same number of
voters, i.e., wd = 1 for each d ∈ D.
• Unrestricted Elections: there are no restrictions on the sizes and weights of the districts.
Of course, the class of symmetric elections is a subclass of that of unweighted elections which in turn is
a subclass of the class of unrestricted elections.
3 The effect of districts for general voting rules
Our aim in this section is to showcase the immediate effect of using districts to distributively aggregate
votes. To this end, we present tight bounds on the distortion of all voting rules in a general election.
We will first state a general theorem relating the distortion gdist(f) of any general election that uses a
voting rule f for the local elections, with the distortion dist(f) of the voting rule.
Theorem 3.1. Let f be a voting rule with dist(f) = γ. Then, the distortion gdist(f) of f in the
general election is
(i) γ + γmk2 for symmetric elections;
(ii) γ + γm2
(
n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) γ + γm
(
n
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unrestricted elections.
Proof. We prove the first two parts together, and the third one separately.
Parts (i) and (ii). Consider a general unweighted election E with a setM ofm alternatives, a setN of
n voters, a setD of k districts such that each district d consists of nd voters (if the election is symmetric,
then nd = n/k) and has weight wd = 1. Let v be the valuation profile consisting of the valuations of all
voters for all alternatives. Let a = j(E) be the winner of the election and denote by A ⊆ D the set of
districts in which a wins according to f . Then, we have that
SW(a|v) =
∑
i∈N
via ≥
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via. (1)
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By the unit-sum assumption we have that∑
j∈M
∑
i:d(i)∈A
vij =
∑
d∈A
nd.
Since a is the winner in the districts of A according to f , and f has distortion at most γ, it must
be the case that
∑
i:d(i)∈A via ≥ 1γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A vij for every j ∈ M. Also, we have that
∑
d∈A nd ≥
|A| ·mind∈D nd. Hence, we obtain∑
i:d(i)∈A
via ≥ 1
γm
·
∑
d∈A
nd ≥ 1
γm
· |A| ·min
d∈D
nd. (2)
Let b be the optimal alternative, and let B ⊂ D be the set of districts in which b is the winner. We split
the social welfare of b into three parts:
SW(b|v) =
∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib +
∑
i:d(i)∈B
vib +
∑
i:d(i)6∈A∪B
vib.
We can now make the following observations:
• Since a wins in the districts of A according to f , the first part is at most γ ·∑i:d(i)∈A via.
• Since the value of each voter in B for b is by definition at most 1, the second part is at most∑
d∈B nd.
• Since ∑j∈M∑i:d(i)=d vij = nd for every district d 6∈ A ∪ B and b loses in d, the total value of
the voters in d for b cannot exceed γ · nd2 , as otherwise, f would have distortion larger than γ. As
a result, the third part is at most γ2
∑
d6∈A∪B nd.
• Since a is the election winner, |B| ≤ |A| and |A| ≥ 1.
Putting all of these together, we upper-bound the social welfare of b as follows:
SW(b|v) ≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
∑
d∈B
nd +
γ
2
∑
d6∈A∪B
nd
≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
γ
2
(
n+
∑
d∈B
nd −
∑
d∈A
nd
)
≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
γ
2
(
n+ |B|max
d∈D
nd − |A|min
d∈D
nd
)
≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
γ
2
· |A| ·
(
n+ max
d∈D
nd −min
d∈D
nd
)
(3)
Hence, by (1), (2) and (3), we obtain
gdist(f) =
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v)
≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A via +
γ
2 · |A| · (n+ maxd∈D nd −mind∈D nd)∑
i:d(i)∈A via
≤ γ + γm
2
(
n+ maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
.
The proof of part (ii) is now complete. For part (i), we get the desired bound of γ + γmk2 by simply
setting mind∈D nd = maxd∈D nd = n/k.
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Part (iii). Observe that the proof of part (iii) does not follow directly from the proof of part (ii) since
now that the districts may have arbitrary weights, the number of districts that the election winner a wins
does not need to be higher than the number of districts in which b is the winner. In other words, it might
be the case that |B| > |A|. However, since |A| ≥ 1, inequality (2) can be simplified to∑
i:d(i)∈A
via ≥ 1
γm
·min
d∈D
nd. (4)
For the optimal alternative b we can also simplify our arguments by using the trivial fact that all voters
not in districts of A have by definition value at most 1 for b. Then, we obtain
SW(b|v) =
∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib +
∑
i:d(i) 6∈A
vib
≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
∑
d6∈A
nd
= γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via + n−
∑
d∈A
nd
≤ γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via + n−min
d∈D
nd. (5)
By combining (1), (4) and (5), we finally have that
gdist(f) =
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v)
≤
γ
∑
i:d(i)∈A via + n−mind∈D nd∑
i:d(i)∈A via
≤ γ + γm
(
n
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
.
This completes the proof.
We now turn to concrete voting rules and consider perhaps the most natural such rule: Range Voting
(RV).
Definition 3.2 (Range Voting (RV)). Given a valuation profile v = (v1, ...,vη) with η voters, Range
Voting elects the alternative that maximizes the social welfare of the voters.
Note that the rule is both unanimous and Pareto efficient. Immediately from the definition of the rule
and Theorem 3.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. The distortion gdist(RV) of RV in the general election is
(i) 1 + mk2 for symmetric elections;
(ii) 1 + m2
(
n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) 1 +m
(
n
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unrestricted elections.
We continue by presenting matching lower bounds on the distortion of any voting rule in a general
election. The high-level idea in the proof of the following theorem is that the election winner is chosen
arbitrarily among the alternatives with equal weight, which might lead to the cardinal information within
the districts to be lost.
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Theorem 3.4. The distortion of all voting rules in a general election is at least
(i) 1 + mk2 for symmetric elections;
(ii) 1 + m2
(
n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) 1 +m
(
n
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unrestricted elections.
Proof. We prove the first two parts together and the third one separately.
Parts (i) and (ii). Consider an unweighted general election with a set of districtsD = {d1, ..., dk} such
that m > k and district d` consists of n` voters for ` ∈ [k]. Suppose that the valuations of the voters
are such that there are k different district winners {a, b, c3, ..., ck}. Then, without loss of generality, the
election winner is one of these alternatives; let a be the winner. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). We define the following
valuation profile v:
• all voters in district d1 have value 1/m+ ε for a and 1/m− εm−1 for every other alternative;
• all voters in district d2 have value 1 for b and 0 for everyone else;
• all voters in district d` for ` ≥ 3 have value 1/2 + ε for c`, 1/2− ε for b and 0 for everyone else.
Note that since the voting rule is unanimous without loss of generality, the winner of the first district is
a, the winner of the second district is b and the winner of district d` for ` ≥ 3 is c`.
The optimal alternative is b with
SW(b|v) =
(
1
m
− ε
m− 1
)
n1 + n2 +
(
1
2
− ε
)
(n− n1 − n2),
while the winner of the election a has
SW(a|v) =
(
1
m
+ ε
)
n1.
As ε tends to zero, the ratio SW(b)/SW(a) becomes
1
mn1 + n2 +
1
2(n− n1 + n2)
1
mn1
= 1 +
m
2
·
(
n+ n2
n1
− 1
)
.
The bounds follow by setting n1 = mind∈D nd and n2 = maxd∈D nd for unweighted elections, and
n1 = n2 = n/k for symmetric elections.
Part (iii). For the unrestricted case, consider a general election such that there is a district d∗ ∈ D
with weight wd∗ >
∑
d∈D\{d∗}wd. Since d
∗ has so much weight, the winner of this district is also the
election winner. Let a and b be two distinguished alternatives, and ε ∈ (0, 1). We define the following
valuation profile v:
• all voters in district d∗ have value 1/m+ ε for a and 1/m− εm−1 for every other alternative;
• all voters in each district d ∈ D \ {d∗} have value 1 for b and 0 for everyone else.
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Since the voting rule is unanimous without loss of generality, a is the winner in district d∗ and b is the
winner in every other district.
The optimal alternative is b with
SW(b|v) =
(
1
m
− ε
m− 1
)
nd∗ + n− nd∗ ,
while the election winner is alternative a with
SW(a|v) =
(
1
m
+ ε
)
nd∗ .
As ε tends to zero, the ratio SW(b)/SW(a) becomes
1
mnd∗ + n− nd∗
1
mnd∗
= 1 +m
(
n
nd∗
− 1
)
,
and the proof follows by setting nd∗ = mind∈D nd.
4 Ordinal voting rules and Plurality
Although Range Voting is quite natural, its documented drawback is that it requires a very detailed
informational structure from the voters, making the elicitation process rather complicated. For this
reason, most voting rules that have been applied in practice are ordinal (see Theorem 2.1), as such
rules present the voters with the much less demanding task of reporting a preference ordering over the
alternatives, rather than actual numerical values.
Thus, a very meaningful question, from a practical point of view, is “What is the distortion of ordinal
voting rules?” The most widely used such rule is Plurality Voting. Besides its simplicity, the importance
of this voting rule also comes from the fact that it is used extensively in practice. For instance, it is used
in presidential elections in a number of countries like the USA and the UK.
Definition 4.1 (Plurality Voting (PV)). Given a valuation profile v and its induced ordinal preference
profile Πv, PV elects the alternative with the most first position appearances in Πv, breaking ties arbi-
trarily.
It is known that the distortion dist(PV) of Plurality Voting is O(m2) [Caragiannis et al., 2017].
Therefore, if we plug-in this number to our general bound in Theorem 3.1, we obtain corresponding
upper bounds for PV. However, in the following we obtain much better bounds, taking advantage of the
structure of the mechanism; these bounds are actually tight.
Theorem 4.2. The distortion gdist(PV) of PV is exactly
(i) 1 + 3m
2k
4 for symmetric elections;
(ii) 1 + m
2
4
(
3n+maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd − 1
)
for unweighted elections;
(iii) 1 +m2
(
n
mind∈D nd − 12
)
, for unrestricted elections.
Proof. We the upper and the lower bounds separately, starting with the former.
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Upper bounds. Consider a general unweighted election E with a setM of m alternatives, a set N of
n voters, a set D of k districts such that each district d consists of nd voters and has weight wd = 1. Let
v be the valuation profile consisting of the valuations of all voters for all alternatives, which induces the
ordinal preference profile Πv. To simplify our discussion, letNd(j) be the set of voters in district d that
rank alternative j in the first position, and also set |Nd(j)| = nd(j).
Let a = j(E) be the winner of the election and denote by A ⊆ D the set of districts in which a wins
according to PV. Then, we have that
SW(a|v) =
∑
i∈N
via ≥
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via. (6)
Since a has the plurality of votes in each district d ∈ A, we have that nd(a) ≥ nd(j) for every j ∈ M,
and by the fact that
∑
j∈M nd(j) = nd, we obtain that nd(a) ≥ ndm . Similarly, for each agent i ∈ Nd(a)
we have that via ≥ vij for every j ∈ M, and by the unit-sum assumption, we obtain that via ≥ 1m . We
also have that
∑
d∈A nd ≥ |A| ·mind∈D nd. Hence,∑
i:d(i)∈A
via ≥
∑
d∈A
∑
i∈Nd(a)
via ≥ 1
m
·
∑
d∈A
nd(a)
≥ 1
m2
∑
d∈A
nd ≥ 1
m2
· |A| ·min
d∈D
nd. (7)
Let b the optimal alternative, and denote by B ⊂ D the set of districts in which b is the winner. We
split the social welfare of b into three parts:
SW(b|v) =
∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib +
∑
i:d(i)∈B
vib +
∑
i:d(i)6∈A∪B
vib. (8)
We will now bound each term individually. First consider a district d ∈ A. Then, the welfare of the
agents in d for b can be written as∑
i:d(i)=d
vib =
∑
i∈Nd(a)
vib +
∑
i∈Nd(b)
vib +
∑
i 6∈Nd(a)∪Nd(b)
vib.
Since a is the favourite alternative of every agent i ∈ Nd(a), vib ≤ via. By definition, the value of every
agent i ∈ Nd(b) for b is at most 1. The value of every agent i 6∈ Nd(a) ∪ Nd(b) for b can be at most
1/2 since otherwise b would definitely be the favourite alternative of such an agent. Combining these
observations, we get ∑
i:d(i)=d
vib ≤
∑
i∈Nd(a)
via + nd(b) +
1
2
∑
j 6=a,b
nd(j)
≤
∑
i:d(i)=d
via +
1
2
nd(b) +
1
2
∑
j 6=a
nd(j)
≤
∑
i:d(i)=d
via +
1
2
nd(a) +
1
2
(
nd − nd(a)
)
=
∑
i:d(i)=d
via +
1
2
nd,
where the second inequality follows by considering the value of all agent in d for alternative a, while
the third inequality follows by the fact that a wins b by plurality. By summing over all districts in A, we
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can bound the first term of (8) as follows:∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib ≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
2
∑
d∈A
nd. (9)
For the second term of (8), by definition we have that the value of each agent in the districts of B for
alternative b can be at most 1, and therefore∑
i:d(i)∈B
vib ≤
∑
d∈B
nd.
For the third term of (8), observe that the total value of the agents in a district d 6∈ A ∪ B for b must
be at most 34nd; otherwise b would necessarily be ranked first in strictly more than half of the agents’
preferences and therefore win in the district. Hence,∑
i:d(i) 6∈A∪B
vib ≤ 3
4
∑
d6∈A∪B
nd.
By substituting the bounds for the three terms of (8), as well as by taking into account the facts that
|B| ≤ |A| and |A| ≥ 1, we can finally upper-bound the social welfare of b as follows:
SW(b|v) ≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
2
∑
d∈A
nd +
∑
d∈B
nd +
3
4
∑
d 6∈A∪B
nd
=
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
4
(
3n+
∑
d∈B
nd −
∑
d∈A
nd
)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
4
(
3n+ |B| ·max
d∈D
nd − |A| ·min
d∈D
nd
)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
4
· |A| ·
(
3n+ max
d∈D
nd −min
d∈D
nd
)
(10)
By (6), (7) and (10), we can upper-bound the distortion of PV as follows:
gdist(PV) =
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A via +
1
4 · |A| · (3n+ maxd∈D nd −mind∈D nd)∑
i:d(i)∈A via
≤ 1 + m
2
4
(
3n+ maxd∈D nd
mind∈D nd
− 1
)
.
This completed the proof of part (ii). For part (i), we get the desired bound of 1+ 3m
2k
4 by simply setting
mind∈D nd = maxd∈D nd = n/k.
For part (iii), Since |A| ≥ 1, we simplify inequality (7) to∑
i:d(i)∈A
via ≥ 1
m2
·min
d∈D
nd. (11)
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For the optimal alternative b we also simplify our arguments by using the trivial fact that all agents not
in districts of A have by definition value at most 1 for b. Then, by also using inequality (9), we obtain
SW(b|v) =
∑
i:d(i)∈A
vib +
∑
i:d(i)6∈A
vib
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via +
1
2
∑
d∈A
+
∑
d6∈A
nd
=
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via + n− 1
2
∑
d∈A
nd
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A
via + n− 1
2
min
d∈D
nd. (12)
By combining (6), (11) and (12), we finally have that
gdist(PV) =
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v)
≤
∑
i:d(i)∈A via + n− 12 mind∈D nd∑
i:d(i)∈A via
≤ 1 +m2
(
n
mind∈D nd
− 1
2
)
.
This completes the proof of the upper bounds.
Lower bounds. We now provide matching lower bounds. For unweighted districts, consider a general
election with a set of districts D = {d1, ..., dk} such that m > k, district d` consists of n` agents for
` ∈ [k], and n1 is a multiple of m. We enumerate the alternatives as M = {j1, ..., jm}. Suppose that the
agent preferences are such that there are k different district winners {a, b, c3..., ck}, where a = jm−1
and b = jm. Then, one of these alternatives is selected as the election winner.
We define the approval votes and the valuation profile v of the voters as follows:
• The voters in district d1 are split into m sets S1, ..., Sm of size n1/m each such that the voters of
set Si approve alternative ji. Since PV is Pareto efficient, we can assume without loss of generality
that the winner in this district is a. The valuations are such that the voters in set Si for i ∈ [m− 2]
have value 1/2 for ji and b, the voters in set Sm−1 have value 1/m for all alternatives, and the
voters in set Sm have value 1 for b.
• The voters in district d2 all approve alternative b and have value 1 for her.
• The voters in district d` for ` ≥ 3 are split into two set of equal size n`/2 such that the voters in
the first set approve alternative c` and the voters in the second set approve b. The voters in the first
set have value 1/2 for both c` and b, while the voters in the second set have value 1 for b.
The optimal alternative is b with
SW(b|v) =
(
(m− 2) · 1
2
+
1
m
+ 1
)
n1
m
+ n2 +
3
4
k∑
`=1
n`
=
n1
m2
+
1
4
(3n− n1 + n2).
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while the winner of the election a has
SW(a|v) = 1
m
· n1
m
=
n1
m2
.
Therefore, the distortion is equal to
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v) =
n1
m2
+ 14(3n− n1 + n2)
n1
m2
= 1 +
m2
4
·
(
3n+ n2
n1
− 1
)
.
The bound follows by selecting n1 = mind∈D nd and n2 = maxd∈D nd. For part (i), we simply set
n1 = n2 = n/k.
For the unrestricted case, consider a general election with k districts such that there is a district
d∗ ∈ D with weight wd∗ >
∑
d∈D\{d∗}wd. Since d
∗ has so much weight, the winner of this district is
the election winner as well. We enumerate the alternatives as M = {c1, ..., cm−2, a, b}. We define the
approval votes and the valuation profile v of the agents as follows:
• District d∗: nd∗m voters approve a and have value 1m for all alternatives; nd∗m voters approve b and
have value 1 for her; nd∗m voters approve alternative ci for i ∈ [m − 2], and have value 1/2 for ci
and b. We assume without loss of generality that the winner in this district is a (since PV is Pareto
efficient).
• District d ∈ D \ {d∗}: all voters approve b and have value 1 for her.
The optimal alternative is b with
SW(b|v) = nd∗
m
(
1
m
+ 1 + (m− 2)1
2
)
+ n− nd∗
=
nd∗
m2
+ n− nd∗
2
.
while the election winner is alternative a with
SW(a|v) = nd∗
m
· 1
m
=
nd∗
m2
.
Therefore, the distortion is equal to
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v) =
n∗d
m2
+ n− nd∗2
nd∗
m2
= 1 +m2 ·
(
n
nd∗
− 1
2
)
.
The proof follows by selecting nd∗ = mind∈D nd.
Our next theorem shows that PV is asymptotically the best possible voting rule among all (determin-
istic) ordinal voting rules.
Theorem 4.3. The distortion gdist(f) of any ordinal voting rule f is
(i) Ω(m2k), for symmetric elections;
(ii) Ω
(
m2 n+maxd∈D ndmind∈D nd
)
, for unweighted elections;
(iii) Ω
(
m2n
mind∈D nd
)
, for unrestricted elections.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary deterministic ordinal voting rule f ; as we explained earlier in Section 2, we can
assume without loss of generality that f is Pareto efficient.
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Parts (i) and (ii). Consider a general election with a set of districtsD = {d1, ..., dk} such that m > k,
district d` consists of n` agents for ` ∈ [k], and n1 is an integer multiple of m. We enumerate the
alternatives as M = {j1, ..., jm} and let a = jm−1, b = jm. We will construct an ordinal preference
profile such that there are k different district winners {a, b, c3, ..., ck}. Then, without loss of generality,
one of these alternatives is selected as the winner of the general election.
We define the rankings and the valuation profile v of the voters as follows:
• The voters in district d1 are partitioned into m sets S1, ..., Sm of equal size n1/m. The voters in
set Si have the ranking ji  ji+1  ...  jm  j1  ...  ji−1. Since each alternative appears
exactly the same number of times in each position and since f is Pareto efficient, any alternative
can be selected as the winner of d1; thus, without loss of generality, we may assume that the
winner is a. The valuations are such that the voters in set Si for i ∈ [m− 2] ∪ {m} have value 1
for alternative ji, while the voters in set Sm−1 have value 1/m for all alternatives.
• All voters in district d2 rank alternative b first and the other alternatives arbitrarily in the remaining
positions. Clearly, since f is Pareto efficient, b is the winner of d2. The valuations are such that
all voters have value 1 for b.
• For each ` ∈ {3, ..., k}, the agents in each of district d` are partitioned into two sets of equal
size. All voters in the first set rank alternative c` first, alternative b second, and then the other
alternatives arbitrarily. All voters in the second set rank alternative b first, alternative c` second,
and then the other alternatives arbitrarily. Given these rankings and by the fact that f is Pareto
efficient, the winner of the district is either c` or b. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
tie is broken in favour of alternative c`. The valuations are such that the voters in the first set have
value 1/2 for c` and b, while the voters in the second set have value 1 for b.
Given the above valuation profile, the optimal alternative is b, while the winner of the election may
be a. Since
SW(b|v) =
(
1
m
+ 1
)
n1
m
+ n2 +
3
4
k∑
`=3
n`
≥ n1
m2
+
1
4
(3n− 3n1 + n2).
and
SW(a|v) = 1
m
· n1
m
=
n1
m2
,
the distortion is
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v) ≥
n1
m2
+ 14(3n− 3n1 + n2)
n1
m2
= 1 +
m2
4
(
3n+ n2
n1
− 3
)
.
The bounds follow by setting n1 = mind∈D nd and n2 = maxd∈D nd for unweighted elections, and
n1 = n2 = n/k for symmetric districts.
Part (iii). For the unrestricted case, consider a general election with k districts such that there is a
district d∗ ∈ D with weight wd∗ >
∑
d∈D\{d∗}wd, and nd∗ is an integer multiple of m. Since d
∗ has
so much weight, the winner of this district is the general election winner as well. We enumerate the
alternatives as M = {j1, ..., jm} and let a = jm−1, b = jm. We define rankings and the valuation
profile v of the voters as follows:
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• District d∗: the voters are partitioned into m sets S1, ..., Sm of equal size nd∗/m. The voters in
set Si have the ranking ji  ji+1  ...  jm  j1  ...  ji−1. Since each alternative appears
exactly the same number of times in each position and since f is Pareto efficient, any alternative
can be selected as the winner of d∗; thus, without loss of generality, we may assume that the
winner is a. The valuations are such that the voters in set Si for i ∈ [m− 2] ∪ {m} have value 1
for alternative ji, while the voters in set Sm−1 have value 1/m for all alternatives.
• District d ∈ D \ {d∗}: all voters rank alternative b first and then the other alternatives arbitrarily.
All voters have value 1 for b. Hence, b is the winner in all these districts.
The optimal alternative is b, while the election winner may be a. Since
SW(b|v) = nd∗
m
(
1
m
+ 1
)
+ n− nd∗
≥ nd∗
m2
+ n− nd∗ .
and
SW(a|v) = nd∗
m
· 1
m
=
nd∗
m2
,
the distortion is equal to
SW(b|v)
SW(a|v) =
n∗d
m2
+ n− nd∗
nd∗
m2
= 1 +m2
(
n
nd∗
− 1
)
.
The proof follows by selecting nd∗ = mind∈D nd.
5 Experiments
Thus far, we have studied the worst-case effect of the partition of voters into districts on the distortion of
voting rules. In this section, we further showcase this phenomenon experimentally by using real-world
utility profiles that are drawn from the Jester dataset [Goldberg et al., 2001], which consists of ratings of
100 different jokes in the interval [−10, 10] by approximately 70,000 users; this dataset has been used
in a plethora of previous papers, including the seminal work of Boutilier et al. [2015]. Following their
methodology, we build instances with a set of alternatives that consists of the eight most-rated jokes.
For various values of k, we execute 1000 independent simulations as follows: we select a random set
of 100 users among the ones that evaluated all eight alternatives, rescale their ratings so that they are
non-negative and satisfy the unit-sum assumption, and then divide them into k districts.
For the partition into districts, we consider both random partitions as well as bad partitions in terms
of distortion. For the construction of the latter, for each instance consisting of a specific value of k and a
set of voters, we create 100 random partitions of the voters into k districts, simulate the general election
(based on the voting rules we consider) and then keep the partition with maximum distortion.
We compare the average distortion of four rules: Range Voting, Plurality, Borda, and Harmonic.
Borda and Harmonic are two well-known positional scoring rules defined by the scoring vectors (m −
1,m − 2, ..., 0) and (1, 1/2, ..., 1/m), respectively. According to these rules, each voter assigns points
to the alternatives based on the positions she ranks them, and the alternative with the most points is the
winner; Plurality can also be defined similarly by the scoring vector (1, 0, ..., 0).
Fig. 1 depicts the results of our simulations for unweighted and weighted districts when the partition
into districts is random and k ∈ {1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25}. As one can observe, the behaviour of the four
voting rules is very similar in both cases, and it is evident that as the number of districts increases, the
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Figure 1: Average distortion from 1000 simulations as a function of the number of districts k with random parti-
tions of voters into districts.
unweighted weighted
k 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Range Voting 1 4.82 4.51 4.50 4.60 1 4.46 4.96 5.14 5.14
Plurality 1.05 5.03 4.66 4.71 4.81 1.05 4.77 5.29 5.47 5.49
Borda 1.01 4.83 4.47 4.50 4.61 1.01 4.51 4.98 5.16 5.18
Harmonic 1.02 4.97 4.60 4.62 4.72 1.02 4.64 5.16 5.35 5.36
Table 1: Average distortion from 1000 simulations with bad partitions of voters into districts.
distortion increases as well. For instance, the distortion of Plurality increased by 3.71% for k = 5
compared to k = 1 (i.e., when there are no districts) and by 6.44% for k = 25; these values are similar
for the other rules as well, although a bit lower. Table 1 contains the results of our simulations for
unweighted and weighted districts when the partition into districts is bad (in terms of the distortion) and
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. As in the case of random districts, we can again observe that the distortion increases
as k increases, but now the difference between the cases with districts (k ≥ 2) and without districts
(k = 1) is more clear; the distortion is almost five times higher.
6 Best-case partitions via districting
In this section we turn out attention to a somewhat different setting. We assume that the k districts are
not a priori defined, and instead we are free to decide the partition of the voters into the districts so
as to minimize their effect on the distortion of the underlying voting rule; we refer to the process of
partitioning the voters into k districts as k-districting. We consider symmetric districts, and start our
analysis with the question of whether it is possible to define the districts so that the optimal alternative
(i.e., the one that maximizes the social welfare of the voters) wins the general election when RV is used
as the voting rule. Unfortunately, as we show with our next theorem, this is not always possible.
Theorem 6.1. For every k ≥ 2, there exists an instance such that no symmetric k-districting allows the
optimal alternative to win the general election when RV is the voting rule.
Proof. Consider a general election with n+1 alternativesM = {a1, ..., an, b} and let k be such that n/k
is an integer for simplicity; then, each district must consist of exactly n/k voters. Let ε ∈
(
0, 12(n+1)
)
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and let v be the valuation profile according to which voter i has value nn+k + ε for alternative ai and
value kn+k − ε for alternative b; her value for the remaining alternatives is zero.
Since SW(ai|v) = nn+k + ε for every i ∈ [n] and SW(b|v) = nkn+k − nε, alternative b is clearly the
optimal alternative. However, observe that all possible sets of n/k voters that can be included together
in a district cannot make b the winner of the district when the voting rule is RV. Indeed, the welfare of
such a set of voters for b is only nn+k − nεk , while their welfare for the alternatives they rank first is nn+k .
Therefore, there is no symmetric k-districting that can make b the winner of the general election with
RV.
In fact, the instance used in the proof of Theorem 6.1 indicates that even the best-case distortion of
RV may be at least k. We continue the bad news by showing that the problem of deciding whether it
is possible to define the districts such that the optimal alternative wins the general election with RV is
NP-hard for k = 2. The proof follows by a reduction from a constrained version of PARTITION.
Theorem 6.2. Deciding whether there is a symmetric 2-districting so that the optimal alternative is the
winner of the general election when RV is the voting rule is NP-hard.
Proof. We show a reduction from a constrained version of PARTITION:
C-PARTITION: Given a set of η positive integer numbers {x1, ..., xη}, find a partition of
them into two sets of equal size and equal sum.
This version of PARTITION is known to be NP-hard (see problem SP12 in [Garey and Johnson, 1979]).
Before we construct the instance of our problem, we normalize the input numbers of the C-PARTITION
instance by dividing with their sum. Hence, in what follows, we assume without loss of generality that
the (now real) numbers {x1, ..., xη} sum up to 1 and the goal of C-PARTITION is to split the numbers into
two sets of equal size such that the sum in each set is exactly 1/2; we also assume that each individual
number is strictly less than 1/2, as otherwise C-PARTITION is easy.
Let ε be an infinitesimally small positive constant. We define a general election with n = η voters,
m = 2n + 1 alternativesM = {a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn, c}, and valuation profile v such that voter i ∈ [n]
has value 1/2−ε for ai, value 1/2+ε−xi for bi, value xi for c, and zero value for any other alternative.
Since SW(ai|v) = 1/2 − ε, SW(bi|v) = 1/2 + ε − xi and SW(c|v) =
∑
i∈[n] xi = 1, the optimal
alternative is c. Hence, the goal is to partition the voters into two districts of n/2 voters each such
that the winner in both districts and therefore the necessary winner of the general election is c. This is
possible if and only if the instance of C-PARTITION is a yes-instance so that the welfare of the voters
in each district is 1/2 for c, slightly more than the welfare of the voters therein for the corresponding
type-a alternatives.
We remark here that we have been unable to extend this intractability result to the case k ≥ 2. The
main characteristic in the instance used in the proof of Theorem 6.2 is that the optimal alternative needs
to win both districts in order to be a necessary winner of the general election. For higher values of
k, winning all districts is not necessary; for instance, for k = 3, an alternative needs to win only two
districts. Therefore, currently it is not very clear how a reduction from a strongly NP-hard problem (say
3-PARTITION) for k ≥ 2 would work.
In contrast to the above result for the optimal alternative and RV, we next show that we can always
find a symmetric k-districting so that the PV winner without districts can be made the winner of the
general election when PV is used as the voting rule within the districts. Since the voting rule is PV,
we assume that the only knowledge which we can leverage in order to define the districts is about the
favourite alternatives of the voters (i.e., for each voter, we know the alternative she approves).
Theorem 6.3. For any k ≥ 2, there always exists a symmetric k-districting that allows the winner of
PV without districts to win the general election with k districts, and this districting can be computed in
polynomial time.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance with set of alternativesM, set of voters N , and valuation profile
v, which induces the ordinal profile Πv. To simplify our discussion, we assume that n/k is an integer.
For every alternative j ∈ M, let N (j) be the set of voters that rank j at the first position according to
Πv, and set n(j) = |N (j)|.
Now, we create k hypothetical districts such that each district consists of n(j)k voters from set N (j)
for every j ∈ M. If all fractions n(j)k are integer numbers, then this clearly defines a partition of the
voters into symmetric districts and the winner of each district (and therefore of the general election) is
the PV winner without districts. In case this is not true however, in order to create a valid partition we
do the following: for each j ∈ M we place bn(j)k c voters of N (j) in the first dk2e districts and dn(j)k e
voters of N (j) in the remaining districts; this is obviously a valid partition. It is easy to verify that the
Plurality winner is the winner of at least dk2e districts and hence the winner of the general election.
We conclude this section by showing that the above result for PV is essentially tight. This follows by
the existence of instances where any partition of the voters into any number of districts yields distortion
for the general election with PV that is asymptotically equal to the distortion of PV without districts.
Theorem 6.4. There exist instances where any symmetric districting yields distortion gdist(PV) =
Ω(m2).
Proof. Consider a general election with m alternatives M = {a1, ..., am}, n = m voters and the
following information about the preferences of the voters: voter i approves alternative ai. Since all
alternatives are approved by a single voter, no matter the partition of the voters into districts, the winner
of the general election can be any alternative. Let x = aw be the winner of the election, and let y = ao
be some other alternative with o 6= w. We define the following valuation profile v for the voters:
• Voter w has value 1m for all alternatives;
• Voter o has value 1 for alternative y;
• Voter i 6∈ {w, o} has value 12 for alternatives ai and y.
Therefore, SW(x|v) = 1m and SW(y|v) = 1m + 1 + (m− 2)12 , and the distortion of PV is at least
1
m + 1 + (m− 2)12
1
m
= 1 +
m2
2
.
Observe that even if we have access to the whole valuation profile v, since the winner is selected to be
the alternative with the most approval votes and each alternative is approved by only one voter, there is
no way to define districts and avoid the possibility of alternative x being elected as the winner.
7 Conclusion and possible extensions
In this paper, we have initiated the study of the distortion of distributed voting. We showcased the effect
of districting on the social welfare both theoretically from a worst- and a best-case perspective, as well
as experimentally using real-world data. Even though we have painted an almost complete picture, our
work reveals many interesting avenues for future research.
In terms of our results, possibly the most obvious open question is whether we can strengthen the
weak intractability result of Theorem 6.2 using a reduction from a strongly NP-hard problem, and also
extend it to k ≥ 2. Moving away from the unconstrained normalized setting that we considered here, it
would be very interesting to analyze the effect of districts in the case of metric preferences [Anshelevich
et al., 2018], a setting that has received considerable attention in the recent related literature on the
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distortion of voting rules without districts [Anshelevich and Postl, 2017; Feldman et al., 2016; Goel et
al., 2018, 2017; Gross et al., 2017; Pierczynski and Skowron, 2019]. Other important extensions include
settings in which the partitioning of voters into districts is further constrained by natural factors such as
geological locations [Lewenberg et al., 2017] or connectivity in social networks [Lesser et al.].
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